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COOPERATIVE MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS:
A CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGAL AND TAX ISSUES
KATHRYNJ. SEDO*
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis in rural America has been well
documented. Farmers faced with large debt service at high interest
rates and low prices for their crops are financially threatened. The
businesses that serve farmers either through the provision of
supplies and services or through the marketing of their products are
also in financial trouble. Cooperative marketing and supply
associations are not exempted from the general financial crisis that
engulfs our rural areas. From 1976 to 1985, 1994 cooperatives were
removed from the lists of the United States Department of
Agriculture, Agricultural Cooperatives Service.1 The reasons for
removal from the list, which presumably means the cooperative is
no longer in existence, and the number of cooperatives for each
reason in parenthesis are: (1) gone out of business (773); (2)
merger or consolidation (357); (3) acquisition (242); (4) other
(622).2 The "other" category includes cooperatives that were
inactive, no longer operating as a cooperative, originally
A.B., 1974, University of Michigan; J.D., 1976, University of Michigan; Associate Clinical
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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1. Letters from Charles A. Kraenzle, Director of the Cooperative Management Division of the
Agricultural Cooperative Service, to KathrynJ. Sedo (Aug. 13, 1986 and Sept. 9, 1986). During the
same time period, 1976 to 1985, 76 cooperatives were added to the list of the Agricultural
Cooperative Service. Letter from Charles A. Kraenzle, Director of the Cooperative Management
Division of the Agricultural Cooperative Service, to Kathryn J. Sedo (Sept. 9, 1986). In 1985, the
Service had 5617 cooperatives on its list. Id.
2. Letter from Charles A. Kraenzle, Director of the Cooperative Management Division of the
Agricultural Cooperative Service, to KathrynJ. Sedo (Aug. 13, 1986).
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misidentified as a cooperative, or no longer in business without any
reason being provided.3 The majority of cooperatives in the other
category were inactive cooperatives.
The initial response of any business to financial adversity is to
contain expenses. If cost containment is unsuccessful, cooperatives
have two options: (1) some form of merger or acquisition or (2)
dissolution or bankruptcy. All states and the District of Columbia
have incorporation laws governing agricultural cooperatives, 4 and
many of these statutes contain provisions regulating the merger,
acquisition, and dissolution of cooperatives. 5 This Article will
explore the legal issues surrounding merger and acquisition of
cooperatives.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF COOPERATIVES
Cooperative associations are member owned and controlled.
6
They may be either stock or nonstock associations, although
generally they issue stock. In the agricultural context, for the most
part, members of the cooperative are farmers or agricultural
3. Id.
4. For a detailed analysis of state incorporation statutes for cooperatives and their provisions,
see J. BAARDA, STATE INCORPORATION STATUTES FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES (Cooperative
Information Report No. 30).
5. At least twenty-eight states refer to merger or acquisition in their cooperative incorporation
statutes. See ALASKA STAT.§ 10.15.400 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN.S 77-1028-29 (1981); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 12530 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-55-112 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
33-206 (West 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. S 421-21.5 (1985); IDAHO.CODE S 22- 2622A (1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 470 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. S 15-7-1-8 (Burns Supp. 1986);
IOWA CODE ANN. S 499.69 (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 272.301, 272.305
(Michic/Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1951 (1981); MD. CORPS.
& ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 5-527(al(19851; MINN. STAT. § 308.15(4) (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-17-
501 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 81.130 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. S 4:13-10 (West 1973); . N.C. GEN.
STAT. 5§ 54-159, 54-160 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-41(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 62.610
(1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12129 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-18- 1
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN.S 43-16-147 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 3-1-30 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 1061 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-339 (1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23.86.220 (West
Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 185.61 (West Supp. 1986).
6. I. PACKEL, THE.LAW OF THE.ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERATIVES 4-5 (1970).
Packel describes cooperatives as having the following characteristics:
Scontrol and ownership of each member is substantially equal;
emembers are limited to those who will avail themselves of the services furnished by
the association;
*transfer of ownership interests is prohibited or limited;
ecapital investment receives either no return or a limited return;
*economic benefits pass to the members on a substantially equal basis or on the basis
of their patronage of the association;
*members are not personally liable for obligations of the association in the absence of a
direct undertaking or authorization by them;
*death, bankruptcy or withdrawal of one or more members does not terminate the
association; and
*services of the association are furnished primarily for the use of the members.
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producers. Each member of the cooperative has one vote regardless
of the number of shares owned or amount of equity in the
cooperative. 7 Dividends on stock or equity are limited, generally by
statute.8 Any surplus or profit 9 that is generated by the cooperative
is distributed among the members according to their respective
patronage of the cooperative and not according to the amount of
equity that the member may have in the cooperative.' 0 Thus, a
cooperative is owned by its member-patrons who democratically
control it and share in its surplus based on their use of the
cooperative.
The most common types of cooperatives serving agricultural
producers are marketing and supply cooperatives." A marketing
cooperative operates, as a rule, by purchasing the products of the
farmer or agricultural producer. It may then store, pool, process
and market the product. At the end of the year, an accounting is
made to the member-patrons and the surplus, which is the net
savings after expenses and dividends are paid, is distributed to
member-patrons in cash and some form of equity credit or stock in
the cooperative. This distribution of cash and equity credit is called
a patronage dividend.' 2
A supply cooperative, which may or may not be operated as
part of a marketing cooperative, provides goods and services that
are used in farming operations.' 3 Fertilizer, seeds, gasoline and
other petroleum products, equipment, pesticides, and insecticides
are a few of the types of products available to farmers on a
7. I. PACKEL, supra note 6, at 106-07; see also T. WHITNEY, AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 18
(Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 306, 1979).
8. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-15-20 (1985) (limiting dividends to six percent). While North
Dakota limits dividends to six percent per annum, many states restrict dividends to eight percent a
year. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. S 308.06 (1984) (limiting dividends to eight percent). See generally
BAARDA, supra note 4, at 112-13 (statutory dividend limitations). This eight percent limitation is also
the rate contained in the Capper-Volstead Act. Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). For a
discussion of the Capper-Volstead Act, see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
9. Because of the unique structure of cooperatives it is more accurate to term the excess revenue
that a cooperative generates as surplus rather than profit. I. PACKEL, supra note 6, at 186-92. The
excess income of cooperatives belongs to the members of the cooperative since the excess revenue
results either from members paying too much for goods and services that they purchased or members
receiving too little for goods or services that they contributed to the cooperative. See id. In either event
the surplus that results is not a profit in the sense that the word is generally used.
10. T. WHITNEY, supra note 7, at 17.
11. See generally K. LIMVERE, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY FOR THENORTHERN PLAINS: COOPERATIVES
AND NORTH DAKOTA 57-64 (1980) (discussing types of cooperatives).
12. See T. WHITNEY, supra note 7, at 18. The distribution of patronage dividends is usually
controlled by Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C.A. §5 1381 to 1388 (1982 &
Supp. 1987). Cooperatives that meet the requirements set forth in subchapter T may deduct the
amounts paid out as patronage dividends from their taxable income. Id. S 1382(b) (1) (1982).
13. See K. LIMVERE, supra note 11, at 57. Supply cooperatives are also referred to as consumer
cooperatives. Id. at 57-58. Supply cooperatives often act not only as a purchasing cooperative, but
also participate in the production of the products that are provided to members. Id. Thus, a fertilizer
cooperative may extend to the mining and manufacturing of fertilizer. Id.
1987] 379
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cooperative basis. Member-patrons purchase the products at
market price. At the end of the year, the cooperative issues
patronage dividends representing its surplus in cash and equity
certificates or stock. 14
III. UNIFICATION OF COOPERATIVES
A. DEFINITIONS
Cooperatives are unified in one of two ways. A merger is the
combining of two or more cooperatives into one cooperative in
which one of the cooperatives survive and the other cooperatives do
not survive.' 5 This can occur as a result of the surviving
cooperative purchasing the stock of the acquired cooperative or as a
result of the surviving cooperative purchasing the assets of the
acquired cooperative. 16 A unification may also take the form of a
consolidation. A consolidation occurs when two or more
cooperatives combine to form a new cooperative, none of the "old"
cooperatives surviving. ' 7
The form that the unification takes has legal and tax
implications. As often is the case, the legal and tax consequences
may dictate the form of the proposed unification.
B. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
Most cooperatives are incorporated associations subject to
individual state cooperative incorporation statutes. Many of these
state incorporation statutes have provisions regulating the merger
and consolidation of cooperatives."' If the cooperative incorporat-
ing statute does not have a provision governing merger and
consolidation, the cooperatives may have to look to the state's
business corporation statute for guidance. 1 9
14. SeeT. WHITNEY, supra note 7, at 17- 18.
15. See E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE.LAW OF MERGERS 27 (1973).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See supra note 5.
19. At least thirty-seven states provide that in the absence of specific provisions in the
cooperative incorporation statutes that the general incorporation statutes will apply except when the
provisions are inconsistent with the cooperative incorporation statutes. See ALA. CODE S 2-10-72
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-702 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77-1018 (1981); CAL. FOOD &
AGrIC. CODE S 54180 (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 7-55-116 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S
33-206 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 8505 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 618.24 (West 1977);
GA. CODE ANN. 5 65-222 (Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. 5 421-21.5 (1985); IDAHO. CODE § 22-
2620(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 470 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-7-1-
-28 (Burns Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1628 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 272.211
(8) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:149 (West 1973); Mo.
[VOL. 63:377380
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Generally there are four statutory requirements for a merger
or consolidation of cooperatives: (1) a plan of merger or
consolidation; (2) approval of the plan by the board of directors of
each cooperative; (3) approval of the plan by the members of each
cooperative; and (4) filing of the plan with the appropriate state
filing office.
20
The plan of merger or consolidation is the most important
document. 21 It contains the agreements between the merging or
consolidating cooperatives, the procedures to carry out the
agreements, and the effect of the merger or consolidation on all the
members of each cooperative. As a general rule the plan also
contains the names of the cooperatives, the name of the surviving
entity, any necessary amendments to the articles of incorporation
and bylaws of the surviving cooperative or the articles of
incorporation and bylaws of the consolidated cooperative, the
composition of the board of directors, the functioning of the merged
or consolidated cooperative, a valuation of equities, and a
procedure for exchange of equities .22
Each cooperative involved in the merger or consolidation
generally appoints members to a committee which negotiates the
content of the plan. 23 Once the negotiations are completed, the plan
must be approved by the board of directors of each cooperative.
After approval of the consolidation or merger by the boards of
directors, the next step is usually approval of the plan by the
membership of the involved cooperatives. 24 Whether a simple
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. S 5-527(a) (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157, § 3 (West.
Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. S 308.05 (1) (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 274.290 (Vernon 1963); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-16-101 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1414 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
27:301:51 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 4:13-12 (West 1973); N.Y. Coop. CORP. LAW § 5 (Concol.
Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. 54-117 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1729.27
(Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 361w (West 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12129
(Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-7-20 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-47-40 (Law. Co-op.
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-16-144 (1980); TEX. AGRIc. CODE ANN. § 52.004 (Vernon 1982); VA.
CODE ANN. 13.1-339 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.32.310 (1969); W. VA. CODE § 19-4-29
(1984); Wyo. STAT. § 17-10-125 (1987).
20. Larson, Legal Requirements of Mergers for Cooperatives, MOVING FOOD, Feb.-Mar., 1985 at 24-
25. See generally BAARDA, supra note 4, at 119-20 (discussing statutory requirements for mergers and
consolidations).
21. Larson, supra note 20, at 25.
22. Id. In preparing the plan for merger or consolidation, a review of the following documents is
necessary: the articles of incorporation and amendments; minute books; stock books and
stockholders' or membership lists; tax returns and related tax documents; annual stockholder reports
and audits; appraisals; surveys, and similar reports; collective bargaining agreements; employment
agreements; employee benefit plans; license and franchise agreements and patents; leases; suppliers'
and customers' contracts; loan agreements; revenue bond financing documents and mortgages;
litigation files; and all other material contracts of each cooperative. R, Morris, Legal Checklist for
Acquisition by a Cooperative Considering Merger, reprinted in Proceedings of the Legal-Finance
Conference 38 (July 8-9, 1981) (University Center for Cooperatives, University of Wisconsin-
Extension).
23. See Larson, supra note 20, at 25.
24. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-41 (1985) (requiring approval of stockholders for merger
or consolidation).
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majority or a larger majority is needed to approve the plan is
provided in the appropriate state statute. 25 Because not all state
cooperative incorporation statutes have specific provisions for
membership approval, or for merger and acquisitions in general,
some thought must be given in those states without specific
requirements as to whether membership approval is necessary, or
appropriate, even if not necessary.
C. MEMBERSHIP APPROVAL AND SECURITIES LAW
CONSIDERATIONS
Approval by the stockholders for the merger or consolidation
of cooperatives is expensive and time consuming. Moreover,
stockholder approval may trigger Security Exchange Commission
(SEC) filing requirements. 26 For these reasons, many regular
business corporations avoid stockholder approval if possible.
Whether or not it is possible and appropriate in a cooperative
merger to avoid a vote of the membership depends on state
statutory provisions and the facts of the particular situation.
1. Membership Approval
Techniques have been developed in the regular business
corporation area to avoid approval by the stockholders of the
surviving corporation and possibly even the acquired corporation
25. At least fifteen states require approval of the plan by two-thirds of the members voting at a
meeting. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77-1030 (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. S 7-55-112 (1986); IDAHO.CODE §
22-2622A; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 111.20(d), 470 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 499.64 (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 272.311 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, S 1951 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 308.15(4) (West Supp. 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-17-503 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-161(a) (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 47-18-1 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1061(3) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-339 (1985);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.86.220 (West Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 185.61 (West. Supp.
1986); see also BAARDA, supra note 4, at 119-20 (membership voting requirements for approval of
plan). At least three states require approval of the plan by two-thirds voting power. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. 5 33-478 (West 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 421-21.5 (1985); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE
ANN. §§ 3-105(d), 5-527(a) (1985).
Furthermore, at least three states require approval of the plan by a majority of the members
voting at a meeting and, in addition, approval of the plan by a majority of the shareholders entitled
to vote. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.15.410 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-7-1-8 (Burns Supp. 1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 3-1-35 (1982). At least four states require approval of the plan by a majority of the
members voting at a meeting. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:13-10 (West 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-15-
41 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 62.610(3) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12129(a) (Purdon Supp.
1987). At least one state requires approval of the plan by a majority of the shareholders entitled to
vote. CAL. CORP CODE SS 152, 1103 (West 1977 & West Supp. 1987).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982) (unlawful to use any means of interstate commerce to offer to
sell or offer to buy securities unless a registration statement is filed); 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (2)
(1986) (there is an offer to sell when stockholders vote on a merger or consolidation). For a discussion
of S 230.145 and filing exemptions, see infra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
382 [VOL. 63:377
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in certain types of mergers. These types of mergers are designated
as "forward triangular" mergers or "reverse triangular"
mergers. 27 While an exhaustive discussion of triangular mergers is
beyond the scope of the Article, a brief discussion of the concept
may be useful because triangular mergers serve other purposes as
well.
28
A forward triangular merger occurs when the subsidiary of the
surviving cooperative acquires another cooperative by exchanging
stock in the surviving cooperative for the stock of the acquired
cooperative. 29 A reverse triangular merger occurs when the
subsidiary of the surviving cooperative is merged into the acquired
cooperative and thus both the surviving cooperative and the
acquired cooperative continue in existence. 3 0
In theory, general business corporations can avoid a vote of
the stockholders of the surviving corporation in either type of
triangular merger assuming that enough authorized stock is
available to complete the merger." Since the surviving corporation
is usually the sole shareholder of its subsidiary, it can approve the
merger of its subsidiary and the acquired cooperative without
membership approval.3 2 Furthermore, it is also possible, in theory,
to avoid a vote of the stockholders in the corporation that is
acquired in a reverse triangular merger. Because the corporation
survives, albeit as a subsidiary of the surviving corporation, a vote
of the stockholders to merge or dissolve may not be needed.
However, what is possible in theory is not always available in
practice, especially when the merger involves cooperatives. As
previously mentioned, most state cooperative statutes require a
vote of the members to approve a merger. 33 Furthermore, if the
27. See generally Ginnings & Jones, Triangular Mergers in Texas, 12 Hous. L. REV. 307, 308-09
(1975) (discussing forward and reverse triangular mergers). A discussion with Ralph K. Morris of
Doherty, Rumble and Butler law firm in Saint Paul, Minnesota indicates that to the best of his
knowledge there has been only two cooperative reverse triangular mergers, and all the members of
both cooperatives voted to approve the merger in both mergers. Telephone interview with Ralph K.
Morris, member of Doherty, Rumble, and Butler law firm (1986).
28. See Raskin, Triangular Mergers: A Useful Technique, 12 COLO. LAW. 1630, 1634 (1983). A
reverse triangular merger may be useful if the cooperative to be acquired has an asset, such as a lease
or a contract that cannot be assigned. Id. at 1634. Furthermore, a reverse triangular merger may be
useful if the acquiring cooperative does not want to assume a contingent or unliquidated debt of the
acquired corporation, such as possible liability in pending litigation. Id.
29. Ginnings &Jones, supra note 27, at 308.
30. See id. at 309.
31. See id. at 319 n.89. If the corporation does not have enough authorized stock outstanding to
complete the merger, the corporation most likely will have to amend its articles of incorporation to
increase the amount of stock it is authorized to distribute. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-19.1-10
(1985) (articles of incorporation must include the number of shares that the corporation is authorized
to issue). An amendment to the articles of incorporation generally requires approval by the board of
directors and approval by the stockholders. See, e.g., id. S 10-19.1-19 (requiring approval of board of
directors and stockholders to amend articles of incorporation).
32. See Ginnings &.Jones, supra note 27, at 319; Raskin, supra note 28, at 1630.
33. See supra note 25.
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articles or bylaws of the acquiring cooperative need to be amended
to authorize additional stock to complete the merger, then the
members will be required to vote on those matters and a'vote on the
merger itself can be had simultaneously. 34 Moreover, if any of the
cooperatives involved in the merger will be dissolved, a vote of the
members is needed to approve the dissolution.
35
Even if a vote of the members is not required by statute to
approve the merger or dissolution or to amend the articles or
bylaws, it can be argued that the distribution of the large amount of
stock that takes place to complete the merger has such an important
effect on the capital of the cooperative, and therefore on the equity
of the members of the cooperative, that a vote is required.3 6 Finally,
and possibly most importantly, it can also be argued that avoidance
of a vote of the members of a cooperative violates the principles
underlying the cooperative form of business. Cooperatives are
intended to be democratically controlled. When such a major
decision about the future operation of the cooperative has to be
made, submitting it to a member vote would conform to this
democratic principle.
2. Securities Law Consideration
As previously stated, one of the reasons that corporations try
to avoid a stockholder vote on a merger is Rule 145 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (1933 Act). 37 Rule 145 provides that an "offer" or
34. See supra note 31.
35. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-15-45 (1985) (a cooperative may be dissolved if resolution
for dissolution is adopted by three-fourths of vote cast thereon); see also BAARDA, supra note 4, at 123-
24 (discussing membership approval of dissolution).
36. While not exactly on point, there are cases cited for the proposition that a cooperative cannot
materially alter the financial provisions of its articles and bylaws to the detriment of its members,
even if approved by a majority of the members as provided in the articles and bylaws. See Whitney v.
Farmers' Co-op Grain Co., 110 Neb. 157, -, 193 N.W. 103, 104-05 (1923); Lambert v.
Fishermen's Dock Cooperative Inc., 61 N.J. 596, -, 297 A.2d 566, 568-71 (1972); Farrier v.
Ritzville Warehouse Co., 116 Wash. 500, -, 199 P. 984, 987 (1921). The rationale of these cases
appears to be that the original articles and bylaws created a contract between the member and the
cooperative which could not later be altered. See Whitney, 110 Neb. at __, 193 N.W. at 104;
Lambert, 61 N.J. at -. , 297 A.2d at 568-69; Farrier, 116 Wash. at __ , 199 P. at 987.
37. 17 C. F.R. § 230.145 (1986). Section 230.145 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Transactions within this section. An "offer," "offer to sell," "offer for sale," or
"sale" shall be deemed to be involved, within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act,
so far as the security holders of a corporation or other person are concerned where,
pursuant to statutory provisions of the jurisdiction under which such corporation or
other person is organized, or pursuant to provisions contained in its certificate of
incorporation or similar controlling instruments, or otherwise, there is submitted for
the vote or consent of such security holders a plan or agreement for:
(2) Mergers or consolidations. A statutory merger or consolidation or similar plan or
acquisition in which securities of such corporation or other person held by such
security holders will become or be exchanged for securities of any person, unless the
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"offer to sell" or "sale" occurs when a merger, consolidation, or
transfer of assets is submitted to shareholders for approval.3 8 Thus,
an informational filing must be made with the SEC and a
continuing duty to file regular reports is created whenever a vote of
the stockholders is required to complete the merger, consolidation
or transfer of assets, 39 unless the transaction is exempt under
provisions of the 1933 Act.
40
Even if a vote is required, it may be possible to avoid a filing in
certain circumstances. Pursuant to the 1933 Act cooperative
securities that are exempt from federal taxation under section 521
of the Internal Revenue Code4' are also exempt from the provisions
of the 1933 Act. 42 Because section 521 only applies to producer
cooperatives and because few producer cooperatives meet the
sole purpose of the transaction is to change an issuer's domicile solely within the
United States; or
(3) Transfers of assets. A transfer of assets of such corporation of other person, to
another person in consideration of the issuance of securities of such other person or
any of its affiliates, if:
(i) Such plan or agreement provides for dissolution of the corporation or
other person whose security holders are voting or consenting; or
(ii) Such plan or agreement provides for a pro rata or similar distribution
of such securities to the security holders voting or consenting; or
(iii) The board of directors or similar representatives of such corporation
or other person, adopts resolutions relative to paragraph (a) (3) (i) or (ii) of this
section within 1 year after the taking of such vote or consent; or
(iv) The transfer of assets is a part of a preexisting plan for distribution of




39. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(1982). Section 77e provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Sale or delivery after sale of registered securities unless a registration statement is
in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) To make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security
for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(c) Necessity of filing registration statement
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus
or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such
security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop
order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding
or examination under section 77h of this title.
Id.
40. See id. § 77c (listing exempt securities).
41. 1.R.C. S 521 (1982).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (5) (1982).
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stringent requirements of section 521, the exemption is not
particularly useful.
43
Other exemptions to the filing requirements of the 1933 Act do
exist. The 1933 Act and Rule 145 do not apply to transactions
which are completely within one state. 44 Moreover, the 1933 Act
allows the SEC to adopt rules exempting relatively small
transactions. 45 For the most part, transactions in which the amount
of the securities involved is less than $1,500,000 are relieved of the
full filing requirement and need only file an offering statement.
46
Furthermore, transactions involving securities in an amount less
than $100,000 are required to provide even less information in the
offering statement. 47 The usefulness of these exemptions will, of
course, depend upon the size and location of the proposed merget
or consolidation.
Rule 145 is also inapplicable if state law provides for a hearing
to determine the fairness of the transaction involved and the
cooperative elects to have such a hearing at the state level. 48 The
43. See I.R.C. S 521 (1982). Section 521 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that farmers'
cooperatives that meet the requirements of that provision are entitled to certain deductions. See id.
These requirements include: (1) the cooperative must be a farmers', fruit growers' or like association
organized and operated on a cooperative basis to market the products of members or other producers
or to purchase supplies and equipment for the use of members or other persons; (2) if the cooperative
is a stock cooperative, substantially all its voting stock must be owned by producers; (3) the dividend
rate on stock cannot exceed the greater of the legal rate of interest in the state of incorporation or
eight percent per annum; (4) financial reserves are limited to those allowed by the state law or what is
reasonable and necessary and such reserves must be allocated to members unless the cooperative
includes them in taxable income; (5) business done with nonmembers may not exceed fifty percent of
the cooperative's business and purchases for patrons who are neither members nor producers may
not exceed fifteen percent of the cooperative's total purchases. Id.
Because these requirements are burdensome, very few agricultural cooperatives have retained
their exemption pursuant to 5 521 and many have utilized the provisions of subchapter T of the
Internal Revenue Code for tax purposes. See L R. C. SS 1381-88 (1982).
44. 15 U.S.C. S 77c(a) (11) (1982). The 1933 Act only applies to interstate transactions. See id.
Although the 1933 Act exempts interstate transactions, state security or "blue sky" laws might still
apply. For a discussion of blue sky laws, see infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
45. See 15 U.S.C. S 77c(b) (1982). Section 77c(b) gives the Securities Exchange Commission
authority to exempt transactions in which the amount of the securities issued is less than $5,000,000.
Id.
46. See 17 C.F.R. S 230.254(a)(1)(i) (1986); Id. S 230.255.
47. See id. 5 230.257(a). Section 230.257 requires only notification and a statement of the
offering attached as an exhibit. See id.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1982). Subsection 77c(a)(10) provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall
not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(10) Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under Title 11, any
security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities,
claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the
terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing
upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is
proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any
court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial
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hearing must be held before any state or territorial banking or
insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly
authorized by law to grant such approval. 49 Furthermore, the state
or territory must have a statute authorizing such hearings and
designating the appropriate officer to conduct them. 50 Currently, it
appears that only a few states have such statutes, 51 even though
these "fairness hearings" may be preferable to a filing in terms of
time and expense.
5 2
It may also be possible to argue that the cooperative shares
which will be exchanged as a result of the merger or consolidation
are not securities within the meaning of the 1933 Act, 53 and
therefore the Act is inapplicable. The United States Supreme Court
in United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman54 determined that the
shares of a nonprofit housing cooperative purchased by the
respondents were not "securities" within the meaning of the 1933
Act. 55 In Forman, the respondent tenants were required to buy stock
in the housing cooperative to acquire an apartment in the
cooperative. 56 In order to attract tenants, the owners of the
banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly




51. See CAL. CORP. CODE S 25140 (West 1977) (procedure for fairness hearing); N.C. GEN.
STAT. S 7A-30 (1985) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 1707.04 (Anderson 1985) (same); OR. REV.
STAT. § 59.095 (1985) (same).
52. For a more detailed discussion of fairness hearings, see generally Glickman, The State
Administrative Fairness Hearing and Section 3(aXJO) of the Securities Act - Some Questions, 45 ST. JOHN.'s L.
REV. 644 (1971); Mann, The Section 3(aXlO) Exemption: Recent Interpretations, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1247 (1975); Rapp, The Interface Between Securities Act S 3(aXlO) and Ohio Revised Code § 1707.04:
Utilitarian Considerations for Ohio Mergers and Corporate Reorganization Transactions, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1 (1978).
53. See 15 U.S.C. 77(b)(1) (1982). Subsection 77(b)(1) defines security. Id. Subsection 77(b)(1)
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security"....
Id.
54. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
55. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975).
56. Id. at 841-42. In Forman the respondents were residents of Co-op City, a housing cooperative
in New York City. 'Id. at 844. To receive an apartment in Co-op City, a tenant had to purchase 18
shares of stock in Riverbay Corporation, a nonprofit cooperative corporation formed to operate Co-
op City. Id. at 841-42.
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cooperative circulated an informational bulletin that estimated the
cost of living in the cooperative lower than the actual price.
57
Because the bulletin was misleading, the tenants alleged that the
owners violated the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act.5 8 The
Court stated that the test to determine if the shares were securities
was whether there existed an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the enterpreneurial efforts of others.5 9 The Court reasoned that,
because the respondents purchased the stock for the purpose of
obtaining living quarters and not as an investment with the hopes
of obtaining profits, the stock did not constitute securities pursuant
to the 1933 Act.
60
The rationale of the Forman decision has been used by at least
two other courts to determine that membership stock of a privately
owned housing cooperative and a producer cooperative were not
"securities" within the meaning of the 1933 Act. 61 While the
rationale used in these decisions is easily applied to the stock that
members purchase to become members or the stock which is issued
as part of the members' patronage dividend, stock issued for other
reasons or to nonmembers does not as easily fall within this
rationale. Therefore, any cooperative relying on the rationale of
Forman and subsequent decisions would do well to carefully review
the case law or request a "no-action" letter from the SEC before
proceeding.62
57. Id. at 843-44. In 1965, Riverbay circulated an informal bulletin that estimated the monthly
costs for living in a Co-op City apartment at $23.02 per room. Id. at 843. By 1974, the average
monthly rental payment was $39.68 per room. Id. at 844.
58. Id. at 844-45; see 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a) (1982) (unlawful for any person in offer or sale of
securities to employ any means to defraud). Riverbay Corporation moved to dismiss the
respondents' complaint on the basis that the stock of Riverbay that was purchased by the
respondents were not securities within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933. Forman, 421 U.S. at
845; see 15 U.S.C. S 77(b)(1) (1982) (defining securities). For the text of § 77(b)(1), see supra note 53.
59. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
60. Id. at 858.
61. See Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612, 613 (2d Cir. 1976) (stock in housing cooperative was
not securities), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976); B. Rosenberg & Sons, Inc. v. St. James Sugar
Coop. Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. La. 1976) (stock in nonprofit sugar cooperative was not
securities).
62. It is possible to request from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) a "no-action"
letter. A no-action letter is a response by the SEC to a request asking for interpretive advice or a
statement that, on the basis of the facts given, the staff of the SEC would not recommend that the
SEC take any enforcement action.
There have been numerous "no-action" requests by cooperatives in which the staff of the SEC
has indicated that the cooperative did not have to register pursuant to the 1933 Act. See, e.g., Front
St. Supermarkets, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,352 (Oct. 15,
1982) (membership shares in nonprofit supermarket were not securities); Seafood Producers Coop.,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,804 (Nov. 18, 1981) (nonprofit supply and
production cooperative could sell stock without registering); United Suppliers, Inc., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,147 (Mar. 14, 1977) (cooperative could implement
capital plan without registration); Wine and Spirits Coop., Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,109 (Feb. 8, 1977) (sale of membership in a cooperative did not require
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Even if the cooperative successfully avoids having to meet the
1933 Act's requirements, the securities or "blue sky" laws of the
individual states may apply. 63 Many states, however, have partial
or total exemptions for cooperative securities, some of which are
much broader than the SEC exemptions.
64
D. ANTITRUST ISSUES
1. Premerger Notification and Waiting Period
If a merger, acquisition, or consolidation between two large
cooperatives is proposed, the antitrust implications must also be
considered. The Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions and mergers
that tend to create concentration and a decrease in the level of
registration); National Rural Util. Coop. Fin. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,707 (Jan. 6, 1972) (membership certificates in a nonprofit cooperative do not need
to be registered); SCDF Inv. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,531
(Sept. 29, 1971) (cooperative could issue securities without registration. upon assurance that the
investment was made without expectation of investment return). Other requests by cooperatives for
no action have been denied when it appeared that some profit motive might exist or the stock was
easily transferable. See, e.g., Family Farm Coop. Inc. (Sept. 30, 1983) (WESTLAW) (membership
interest in cooperative was securities); Garden State Coop. Group Inc. (Dec. 16, 1982)
(WESTLAW) (same); Wheatbelt Merchandising Group Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 76,446 (May 30, 1980) (same).
63. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §5 10-04-01 to -19 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (blue sky laws).
64. Some states provide for a blanket exemption for all cooperative securities. See, e.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 10-04-05(9) (Supp. 1987) (exempting securities of any cooperative formed pursuant to
North Dakota statutes). Other states have more limited exemptions, such as exemptions only for
stock issued to evidence membership or issued as a patronage exemption. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
S 17-1261(k) (Supp. 1986) (exempting securities issued to evidence membership or issued as a
patronage divided by a cooperative). Furthermore, while a few states exempt cooperative securities
by attorney general opinions or agency rules, other states contain no exemptions for cooperative
securities. In the states that have no exemption for cooperatives, cooperatives must look to other
exemption provisions to determine if they apply or argue that the cooperative stock is not a security
pursuant to the Forman test. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. For a discussion of Forman, see supra notes
54-62 and accompanying text.
Research indicates that while Utah exempts cooperative securities only by attorney general
opinion and Pennsylvania exempts cooperatives solely by agency rule, 34 states have statutory
exemptions for securities or transactions of cooperatives, at least in some limited form. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. S 67-1248(12) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 7-55-115 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
36-490(a)(15) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7309(a)(12) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
517.051(7) (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-108(5) (Harrison Supp. 1986); HAW. REV.
STAT. 5 485-4(14) (1985); IDAHO-CODE § 30-1434(12) (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 Y2, para.
137.3(S) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 17-1261(k) (Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. 5 292.400(12) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 51.708(5) (West
Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502(1)(M) (Supp. 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
I 10A, 5 402(a)(12) (West Supp. 1987); MicH. .CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.802(b)(16) (West Supp.
1987); MINN. STAT. § 80A.15(2)(j) (Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. S 75-71-201(12) (Supp. 1986);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.402(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17(II)(j)
(1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 78A-16(14) (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-05(9) (Supp. 1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.02(I) (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, S 401(a)(5) (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §
59.025(9) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 7-8-31 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. 533-49-60 (Law. Co-op. 1977);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-79 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 48-2-103(a)(12) (Supp. 1986);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(N) (Vernon Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4203(8)
(Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(a)(12) (1985); WASH. .REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.320(16)
(Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE 5 32-4-402(a)(12) (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.22(12) (West Supp.
1987).
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competition in an industry. 65 In 1976, the Clayton Act was
amended to provide for premerger notification in certain
instances. 66 Notification is given to the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission, and a waiting period is prescribed
before any merger or acquisition may take place. 67 The notification
and waiting period requirements were adopted because often when
a merger or consolidation was challenged after the fact and found to
be improper, rescinding the merger or consolidation was not a
practical remedy. 6 Thus, premerger notification allows the merger
to be prevented before it actually takes place.
A cooperative which is exempt under the Clayton Act or the
Capper-Volstead Act is exempt from the premerger notification
requirements. 69 The criteria for exempt status under the Clayton
Act includes agricultural organizations that do not have capital
stock or are not conducted for profit. 70 In the Capper-Volstead Act,
65. See 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1982). Section 18 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject tojurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons
engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the
voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
66. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(codified in scattered sections of15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
67. 15 U.S.C. S 18a(b) (1982). Section 18a proscribes a 30 day waiting period prior to merger or
acquisition; however, the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission may within their
discretion extend the waiting period for an additional period of not more than 20 days. Id. § 18a(e).
In addition, the United States district court may extend the established 30 day waiting period until
the court determines notification has been achieved. Id.
68. See Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: An
Analysis, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 1, 12 (1977). When a merger or consolidation was consummated
but subsequently declared illegal no practical remedy existed. Id. Proponents of premerger
notification and waiting period requirements stated that although antitrust agencies were generally
successful in challenging mergers, no adequate remedy existed once the merger was declared illegal.
Id. Trying to undo the illegal merger was frequently compared to trying to unscramble an egg. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. S 18a(c)(5) (1982) (a listing of transactions that are exempt from the requirements
of premerger notification and waiting period).
70. Id. § 17. Section 17 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out
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the exceptions were expanded to include associations of agricultural
producers,71 corporate or otherwise, with or without stock, that
operate for the mutual benefit of its members, that do not deal in
the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in value than
such as are handled by it for members, and that either: (1) allow
only one vote per member; or (2) pay no more than eight percent
per annum in dividends on stock. 72 This exemption does not extend
to other types of cooperatives, such as consumer or worker
cooperatives, or to agricultural producer cooperatives not meeting
the stated criteria. 73 In addition, the exemption applies only to
cooperatives that merge or consolidate with other exempt
cooperatives. 74 Moreover, the requirements that all members of an
exempt cooperative be agricultural producers and that all parties to
a merger or consolidation be exempt cooperatives have been strictly
construed by the United States Supreme Court.7 5
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.
Id.
71. See 7 U.S.C. S 291 (1982). Section 291 defines agricultural producers. Id. Section 291
provides, in relevant part, as follows: "Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as
farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers .... " Id. Additional clarification of this
definition can be found in court decisions. See, e.g., National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n. v. United States,
436 U.S. 816, 823-29 (1978) (presence of nonproducers in the marketing association removed it from
the protections of the Capper-Volstead Act).
72. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). At least 75% of the cooperative association must be owned or
controlled by agricultural producers in order for the cooperative to be considered composed of
agricultural producers. Id. S 2.
73. See id. 5 291. In addition to exempting agricultural producer cooperatives that meet its
criteria from the premerger notification and waiting period requirements of the Clayton Act or the
Capper-Volstead Act, 5 291 also exempts marketing agencies or associations owned by agricultural
producer cooperatives. Id.
For a more complete discussion of cooperative antitrust immunity, see Rowley & Beshore,
Chicken Intergrators' Price-Fixing: A Fox in the Capper-Volstead Coop, 24 S.D.L. REV. 564 (1979); Warlich
& Brill, Cooperatives Vis-a-Vis Corporations: Size, Antitrust and Immunity, 23 S.D.L. REV. 561 (1978).
74. Rowley & Beshore, supra note 73, at 568. In addition to merger between an exempt and a
nonexempt cooperative, other activities that are beyond the scope of an agricultural producer
cooperative's legitimate purposes are not granted exempt status under the Clayton Act or the
Capper-Volstead Act, generally these unprotected activities are categorized as predatory practices.
See, e.g., Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 465-66
(1960) (agricultural cooperatives are protected when lawfully carrying out their legitimate objectives,
but are not protected if engaging in predatory trade practices); Alexander v. National Farmers Org.,
687 F.2d 1173, 1182 (8th Cir. 1982) (farm cooperatives are exempt under federal laws as long as they
do not resort to predatory practices), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); Pacific Coast Agric. Export
Ass'n v. Sunist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975) (farm cooperatives are not
immunized by the Clayton Act nor by the Capper-Volstead Act when they engage in competition-
stifling or predatory practices), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
75. See, e.g., National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822-24 (1978) (all
parties must comply with the merger requirements of the Capper-Volstead Act, and in addition,
comply with the narrow definition of agricultural producer); Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v.- Sunkist
Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 391, 395-96 (1967) (Congress intended only actual producers of
agricultural products to qualify for exempt status and in order to keep their exempt status,
agricultural producers must not unite with nonproducer interests), United States v. Borden Co., 308
U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939) (producers of agricultural products, as defined in the Capper-Volstead Act,
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In addition, the notification and waiting period requirements
apply to any nonexempt transaction: (1) in which at least one party
is engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce; 76 (2)
that involves parties of significant size; 77 and (3) that would result
in the acquisition of at least fifteen percent or $15,000,000 of the
voting securities or assets of the acquired party. 78  Thus,
cooperatives not involved in interstate activities or whose business
volume does not meet the threshold requirements need not be
concerned with the established premerger notification and waiting
period. The practical effect of the jurisdictional thresholds and
exemptions is that only the largest cooperative mergers or
consolidations will be required to comply with the premerger
notification and waiting period requirements.
2. Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines
If a cooperative is not exempt from the antitrust laws and is
large enough to require premerger notification, it will at a
minimum, have to comply with the 1984 United States Department
of Justice Merger Guidelines.79 Briefly, the purpose of the Merger
Guidelines is to identify those mergers and acquistitions that are
likely. to produce or enhance market power.8 0  To determine
whether an enhancement of market power will occur, the Merger
Guidelines is to identify those mergers and acquisitions that are
the level of concentration in the relevant market. 81 The Merger
Guidelines contain a procedure that: (1) defines the relevant
market; (2) computes the market share; (3) applies preliminary
decision rules to approve acquisitions that are unlikely to produce
may combine with each other but will lose their exempt status if agricultural producers unite with
persons outside their defined, exempt group).
76. 15 U.S.C. S 18a(a)(1) (1982).
77. See id. § 18a(a)(2). Subsection 18a(a)(2)(A) requires premerger notification and a waiting
period if any voting securities or assets of a person engaged in manufacturing that has annual net
sales or total assets of at least $10,000,000 are being acquired by a person with annual net sales or
total assets of at least $100,000,000. Id. § 18a(a)(2)(A). Subsection 18a(a)(2)(B) requires premerger
notification and a waiting period of any voting securities or assets of a person not engaged in
manufacturing that has annual net sales or total assets of at least $10,000,000, and are being
acquired by a person that has annual net sales or total assets of at least $100,000,000. Id. §
18a(a)(2)(B). Subsection 18a(a)(2)(C) requires premerger notification and a waiting period if any
voting securities or assets of a person with annual net sales or total assets of at least $100,000,000 are
being acquired by a person with annual net sales or total assets of at least $10,000,000. Id.
8a(a)(2)(C).
78. Id. S 18a(a)(3).
79. See U.S. Department of justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,827 (1984) thereinafter
Merger Guidelines].
80. See Bronsteen, A Review of the Revised Merger Guidelines, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 615 (Winter
1984) (detailed discussion of the Merger Guidelines).
81. See id. The fundamental concern of the Merger Guidelines is the proposed acquisition's size
and potential market concentration. Id.
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market power or enhance market share; (4) examines additional
factors in more complex cases; and (5) considers relevant
defenses. 82  The Merger Guidelines are designed to allow
cooperatives to predict the merger enforcement policy of the
Department of Justice.8 3 It must be cautioned, however, that the
Merger Guidelines do not bar the Department ofJustice's ability to
take action as it deems necessary to achieve the purposes of the law.
While Department of Justice challenges to cooperative
mergers and acquisitions do exist, 84 they appear to be relatively
infrequent. Generally, these challenges tend to involve the
acquisition by a cooperative of a noncooperative business.8 5 While
acquisitions by cooperatives of noncooperative businesses are
beyond the scope of this discussion, it is clear that most of the issues
raised herein concerning mergers between cooperatives, apply
equally to cooperative and noncooperative mergers and
consolidations.
E. TAX CONSIDERATIONS
In any contemplated merger or consolidation one must be
aware of the federal and state tax laws that could result in tax
liability. Absent a statutory exemption, the exchange of stock in
one corporation for stock or property in another corporation is a
taxable event. Cooperatives are subject to the tax laws regarding
mergers, consolidations and reorganizations just like any other
corporation. 86  Fortunately, it is possible to structure most
cooperative mergers and consolidations so that one of the statutory
exemptions will apply.
As previously mentioned, cooperative mergers may take two
forms: (1) acquisition of the stock of the acquired cooperative; or
82. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, at 26,827-34, 26,837 (detailed discussion of the factors
the Department of Justice addresses in determining whether an enhancement of the market will
occur); see also Bronsteen, supra note 80, at 615-27 (summary of the factors that the Department of
Justice addresses in determining whether an enhancement of the market will occur).
83. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 79, at 26,827 (purpose and underlying policy assumptions
of Merger Guidelines).
84. See, e.g., Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
460-61 (1960) (United States challenged cooperative merger in an antitrust action); United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 190 (1939) (United States challenged combination and conspiracy in an
antitrust action); United States v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,958 (W.D.
Wash. 1969) (cooperative acquisition challenged by the United States).
85. See, e.g., Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 362 U.S. at 461-62. (agricultural
producer cooperative attempted to acquire a business that was not an agricultural producer
cooperative); United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,287
(E.D. Cal. 1986) (a rice growers cooperative attempted to acquire a noncooperative rice milling
corporation); Western Farmers Ass'n, 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,958 (a farmers cooperative
attempted to acquire a noncooperative processing plant).
86. See Clark & Erickson, Taxation of Cooperatives, 229-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-1, A-28 (1984)
(discussing cooperative reorganizations and the tax effects involved).
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(2) acquisition of the assets of the acquired cooperative. Generally,
tax considerations will favor choosing the acquisition of stock
method.
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) defines seven
types of corporate reorganizations, including mergers and
consolidations, that are "tax-free." 87  The seven types of
reorganizations are as follows: (1) statutory merger or
consolidation;88 (2) the acquisition of one corporation by another
corporation solely through the exchange of voting stock;8 9 (3) the
acquisition of one corporation by another corporation solely
through the exchange of voting stock for all, or substantially all, of
the assets of the acquired corporation; 90 (4) the transfer by one
corporation to another corporation of a controlling interest in the
assets of the acquired corporation; 91 (5) recapitalization; 92 (6)
change in identity, form, or place of the corporate organization; 93
and (7) the transfer by one corporation of all or part of its assets to
another corporation in a bankruptcy proceeding. 94 In addition to
conforming with one of these seven statutory forms, the business
enterprise must continue and there must be continuity of
ownership interest after the reorganization. 
95
The presence of "boot," such as cash or other property, as
part of the exchange does not remove the corporate reorganization
87. See I.R.C. § 368 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (types of corporate reorganization that will result
in a tax-free transaction if all of the statutory requirements are complied with).
88. See id. § 368(a)(l)(A) (1982). A large majority of cooperative reorganizations are structured
as statutory mergers or consolidations. See Clark & Erickson, supra note 86, at A-28. Merger or
consolidation is the most common type of reorganization for cooperatives because the cooperative's
unique capital structure usually does not lend itself to the other types of reorganization. Id. at A-28.
89. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982). Corporate reorganization can occur by acquiring a
controlling interest in the voting stock of another corporation. Id.
90. See id. § 368(a)(1)(C). Corporate reorganization can occur by exchanging controlling interest
in the voting stock of the acquiring corporation for substantially all of the properties of the acquired
corporation. Id.
91. See id. § 368(a)(1)(D). Corporate reorganization can occur by transferring controlling
interest of the assets of the acquired corporation to the acquiring corporation if the asset transfer
transaction complies with § 354, 355, or 356 or the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Id. See generally id.
§ 354 (exchanges of stock and securities in certain reorganizations); id. § 355 (distribution of stock
and securities of a controlled corporation); id. § 356 (receipt of additional consideration).
92. See id. § 368(a)(1)(E).
93. See id. § 368(a)(1)(F).
94. See id. § 368(a)(l)(G). Corporate reorganization can occur by the asset transfer of one
corporation to another corporation in a bankruptcy or similar case, if the acquiring corporation
complies with § 354, 355, or 356 of the IRC. Id. For a discussion of S 354, 355 and 356, see supra
note 91. Pursuant to § 368(a)(1)(G), a "bankruptcy or similar case" has been defined as a case under
title 11 of the United States Code, or a receivership, foreclosure, or similar proceeding in a federal or
state court. See I.R.C. 5 368(a)(3)(A) (1982).
95. See 26 C.F.R. 51.368-1(b) (1987). A requisite to a reorganization under the IRC is that the
business enterprise continue under the modified corporate form. Id. In addition, a continuity of
ownership interest on the part of those who were the owners of the acquiring corporation is
necessary. Id.
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from tax exemption. 96 This gain of additional consideration is
recognized to the extent of the cash or other property received; 97
however, no loss on the reorganization would be recognized. 98
In addition, Section 354(a) of the IRC provides that no gain or
loss must be recognized if stock or securities in one corporation are
exchanged solely for stock or securities in another corporation
pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 99 This exemption, however,
does contain limitations. 100 Section 354(a) does not apply to: (1) the
principal amount of any securities received that exceeds the
principal amount of any securities surrendered; 10 1 or (2) any stock,
securities or other property received that is attributable to accrued
interest on the securities surrendered. 10 2 Thus, unless one of the
limitations apply a "stock for stock" merger would be tax-free to
the stockholders.
Similarily, section 361 of the IRC provides that no gain or loss
must be recognized if a corporation exchanges property solely for
stock or securities in another corporation pursuant to a plan of
reorganization.0 3  Thus, an "assets for stock" type of
reorganization would be tax-free as to the stock exchanged. No tax
exemption applies, however, to -the recapture of depreciation on
personal or real property; therefore, the recapture provisions of the
IRC apply. 10 4 The gain realized on the sale of these assets is
ordinary income for the cooperative, and possibly for its members
if the cooperative passed the gain through to them. 10 5 For this
reason, the exchange of assets for the stock of another cooperative
often leads to taxable income for the cooperative or for its
members, and is therefore avoided if possible. 106
The tax laws regarding the tax liability for triangular mergers
are quite complex. Any organization contemplating a triangular
96. See Clark & Erickson, supra note 86, at A-29. Although the "boot" or additional
consideration received in the corporate reorganization will not remove the transaction from its tax-
free status, the "boot" may trigger a gain on the exchange under § 356 of the IRC. Id.
97. See I.R.C. S 356(a)(1) (1982). Additional consideration received in a corporate
reorganization must be recognized; however, the amount recognized must not exceed the sum of any
cash received plus the fair market value of any such property received. Id.
98. See id. 5 356(c). No loss on additional consideration received during a corporate
reorganization must be recognized. Id.
99. See id. § 354(a)(1) (general rule for exchanges of stock or securities in reorganizations).
100. See id. S 354(a)(2).
101. See id. § 354(a)(2)(A) (excess principal amount limitation).
102. See id. § 354(a)(2)(B) (property attributable to accrued interest limitation).
103. See id. § 361(a).
104. See id. § 1245(a)(1) (gain from disposition of certain depreciable property is classified as
ordinary income and any such gain must be recognized as taxable); id. S 1250(a)(1)(A) (gain from
disposition of certain depreciable realty is classified as ordinary income and any such gain must be
recognized as taxable).
105. See id. 5 1245(a)(1); id. § 1250(a)(1)(A).
106. See id. S 1245(b)(3) (limiting the amount of gain that can be realized in certain tax-free
transactions); id. 1250(d)(3) (same).
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merger would do well to consult the tax laws carefully. The most
recent change in the IRC concerning triangular mergers occurred
in 1971.107 By further defining "party to a reorganization,"
Congress effectively overruled two United States Supreme Court
cases which had determined that triangular mergers were taxable
events. 108 The Internal Revenue Service, however, did not issue
final regulations concerning its interpretation of these changes until
1985 - fourteen years after the statutory changes had taken
place. 10 9 It appears that under certain limited circumstances
triangular mergers may be tax-free events.'' 0  Therefore,
cooperatives contemplating this type of merger can now structure
the transaction in order to avoid tax liability. I
Cooperatives can request advice from the Internal Revenue
Service regarding the tax consequences of proposed mergers or
consolidations. Essentially all of the Revenue Rulings and Private
Letter Rulings have determined these proposed transactions to be
tax-free events." 2 Therefore, it is clear that cooperative mergers
and consolidations can be structured to avoid taxable
consequences. Similarly, triangular mergers can also be structured
to avoid taxable consequences. Obviously, any merger or
consolidation should be structured in order to minimize or avoid
tax liability, keeping in mind the original objectives and concerns of
the cooperatives involved.
107. SeeAct of.Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2077 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
368(a)(2)(E), (b) (1982) (defining qualifying statutory mergers and "party to a reorganization").
108. See Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 458 (1938); Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
82, 90 (1937).
109. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,688 (1985) (Internal Revenue Service's final regulations pertaining to
statutory merger using voting stock of the corporation controlling the merged corporation).
110. See I.R.C. S 368(a)(2)(E) (1982). A corporation that was in control of the stock of the
merged corporation before the merger occurred, can avoid taxation if: (1) after the merger the
surviving corporation holds substantially all of the property of both its own corporation and the
merged corporation; and (2) during the transaction the shareholders in control of the surviving
corporation exchange that controlling interest of stock for an amount of stock in the controlling
corporation. Id. Under § 368 of the IRC, a controlling corporation complies with the definition of a
"party to a reorganization." Id. § 368(b).
111. See generally Braubach & McCluskey, Triangular Reorganizations: Proposed Regulations, 7 J.
CORP. L. 1 (1981) (discussing proposed regulations concerning triangular mergers); Report on Reverse
Triangular Mergers and Basis-Nonrecognition Rules in Triangular Reorganizations, 36 TAX L. REV. 395
(1981) (same); Ferguson & Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAX L. REV. 159 (1973) (general
discussion regarding triangular reorganizations).
112. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-22, 1968-1 C.B. 142 (Internal Revenue Service advised that the
stated reorganization was tax-free); Rev. Rul. 55-305, 1955-1 C.B. 345 (Internal Revenue Service
advised that the stated statutory merger was tax-free); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-02-046 (Internal Revenue
Service ruled that no gain or loss must be recognized in proposed reorganization); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-
38-016 (Internal Revenue Service ruled that proposed triangular statutory merger would be tax-
free); see also Clark & Erickson, supra note 99, at A-29 (discussing various participants in cooperative




F. OBJECTIONS TO THEMERGER OR CONSOLIDATION
1. Protection for Stockholders
Traditionally, there have been two safeguards for stockholders
in any proposed merger or consolidation: (1) ratification; and (2)
appraisal rights. 113 Ratification is stockholder or member approval
of a plan of merger or consolidation. 114 As was stated previously,
merger techniques have been developed to avoid stockholder votes
for regular corporate mergers and consolidations. 1 5 Ratification,
however, is still the general rule in cooperative mergers or
consolidations thus providing cooperative members with somewhat
more protection.
The other safeguard, appraisal rights for dissenters, is a
stockholder's statutory right to be paid the value of his or her shares
when a triggering event occurs.'1 6 This protection is common in
business corporation statutes and rare in cooperative incorporation
statutes. In a business corporation, the right of a stockholder who
objects to a proposed merger or consolidation to have his or her
stock appraised and to receive that amount in cash is established by
individual state laws. " 7 This right most certainly appeared in order
to assure the fairness of the merger or consolidation, as well as to
assure that no stockholder be forced to remain an owner after so
profound and fundamental a change as a merger or consolidation
has taken place.
In order to determine whether appraisal rights exist in a
cooperative merger or consolidation, one must review the
cooperative incorporation statute to see if it specifically gives
dissenters such a right. 18 If the right to appraisal does not appear
113. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297,
299 (1974).
114. Id.; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-41 (1985) (requiring approval of merger or
consolidation by shareholders).
115. For a discussion of techniques utilized to avoid stockholder votes, see supra notes 27-32 and
accompanying text.
116. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 113, at 304; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-87
(1)(b) (1985) (rights of dissenting shareholders to obtain payment for fair value of shares in event of
corporate merger).
111. All states have general corporation statutes which provide tor dissenters' appraisal rights
when a merger occurs and specify the triggering events. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-19.1-87
(1985) (rights of dissenting shareholders). At least forty-three states provide for appraisal rights in the
event of a sale of assets and at least fourteen states provide for appraisal rights in share exchanges.
See, e.g., id. At least seventeen states provide for appraisal rights upon amendment to the articles of
incorporation. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. S 302A.471 (1986). At least twenty-two states provide that no
appraisal rights exist if the shares are listed on a national stock exchange or if the corporation's shares
are held by more than a certain number of shareholders. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300(b) (Supp.
1987).
118. At least four states have special provisions for dissenters' rights in their cooperative
incorporation statutes. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 449.65 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN.
35-16-211 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 3-1-39 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 5 1061 (1984).
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on the face of the statute, several other sources should be consulted.
The cooperative incorporation statute might make specific
reference to the business incorporation statute and provide that the
provisions of the business incorporation statute will apply if not
inconsistent with the provisions of the cooperative incorporation
statute. 119 Whether the business corporation statute applies may
also be found in state attorney general opinions. 120 A final source to
be consulted is case law. At least one state, Wisconsin, has
authority which provides that no appraisal rights exist in a merger
or consolidation. 121
In all states in which there is no specific provision in the
cooperative incorporation statutes making reference to the business
corporation statutes, 122 or in which no judicial authority exists, the
question of appraisal rights remains open. It can be argued even in
states with cooperative statutes which do reference the business
corporation statute that the appraisal rights provisions of the
business corporation statutes do not apply to cooperative mergers.
Most state cooperative statutes which reference the business
corporation law make it clear that only those provisions which are
not inconsistent with the cooperative statute will apply.1 23 A
cooperative could argue that appraisal rights in cooperative
mergers and consolidations are inconsistent with provisions of the
cooperative incorporation statute. At least two compelling
arguments to support this contention can be made.
Many cooperative incorporation statutes provide procedures
for the merger and consolidation of cooperatives. 124 In these states,
if the statutes do not provide for appraisal rights, it can be argued
that the lack of statutory provision for appraisal rights was a
119. For a list of states which have cooperative incorporation statutes which refer to the business
corporation statutes as being applicable to cooperatives if not inconsistent or if not otherwise
provided, see supra note 19.
120. See, e.g., 5047 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 495, 496 (1976) (general business corporation statutes
apply to nonprofit corporations).
121. See Pearson v. Clam Falls Coop. Dairy Ass'n, 243 Wis. 369, -, 10 N.W.2d 132, 134
(1943) (dissenting stockholders have no right to insist on being paid their patronage dividends in cash
pursuant to consolidation).
122. At least three states and the District of Columbia have no specific statutory provisions
concerning shareholder appraisal rights in a cooperative merger or consolidation and do not
reference the business corporation laws. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. SS 29-1101 to -1147 (1981 & Supp.
1987); NEV. REV. STAT. S§ 81.002-660 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-15-01 to -61 (1985 & Supp.
1987); OR. REV. STAT. S 62.005-865 (1985).
123. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77-1018 (1981). Section 77-1018 of the Arkansas Statutes
Annotated provides as follows: "The provisions of the general corporation laws of this state, and all
powers and rights thereunder, shall apply to the associations organized hereunder, except where
such provisions are in conflict with or inconsistent with the express provisions of this act [S§77-101 to
1025J." Id. For a list of states which have cooperative incorporation statutes which refer to the
business corporation statute as being applicable to cooperatives if not inconsistent or if not otherwise
provided, see supra note 19.
124. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §S 10-15-41, - 42 (1985) (procedures for cooperative mergers
and consolidations). For a list of states which have statutory provisions for mergers and
consolidations of cooperatives, see supra note 5.
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deliberate legislative omission and that the legislature determined
that the shareholder's rights are adequately protected by other
means, such as ratification.
Whether or not specific statutory procedures exist for mergers
or consolidations, it can be further argued that since cooperatives
are democratically controlled, a member of a cooperative already
has more protection for his or her rights than a stockholder in a
business corporation. Moreover, since membership and the
transfer of stock in a cooperative is expressly conditioned on board
of director approval in most cooperative incorporation statutes, 1
2 5
providing appraisal rights for stockholders would contradict this
express statutory provision. 2 6 Finally, it can be argued that the
rationale used to uphold the validity of requiring board of director
approval for all transfers of interest, that any other rule would
seriously impair the ability of the cooperative to continue in
business, is equally applicable here. 127 The ability of the surviving
cooperative or the newly formed cooperative to continue operation
would be considerably hampered if members were allowed to use
the event of a merger or consolidation to "cash out." Therefore, in
the absence of specific statutory or judicial authority for appraisal
rights, a strong argument can be made that other provisions of the
cooperative incorporation statutes are inconsistent with appraisal
rights and that the democractic nature of cooperatives provides
adequate protection for members.
While a convincing argument can be made that no appraisal
rights exist in cooperative mergers unless provided for by statute, in
at least one cooperative merger, the court determined that
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 308.06(2) (5) (1986) (shares of stock shall be transferable only with
the approval of the board of directors of the association).
126. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 308.06(2) (5) (1986). The right ofa cooperative's board of directors
to refuse the request of a member to repurchase his or her shares or to repay equity owed the member
immediately upon the termination of the membership has been upheld by numerous courts. See, e.g.,
Knox Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n v. Phillips, 300 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1937) (association had no duty to
retire member's shares upon member's request); Sanchez v. Grain Growers Ass'n, 126 Cal. App. 3d
675, 675, 179 Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 (1981) (same); Driscoll v. East-West Dairymen's Ass'n, 122 P.2d
379, 380-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (same); Massaro v. Tampa Better Milk Producers Co-op, 200 So.
211, 211 (Fla. 1941) (same); Claassen v. Farmers Grain Coop., 208 Kan. 129, -, 490 P.2d 376, 380
(1971) (same); Richardson v. South Ky. Rural Elec. Coop., 566 S.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978) (same); Evanenko v. Farmers Union Elevator, 191 N.W.2d 258, 261 (N.D. 1971)
(same). But see Souris River Tel. Mut. Aid Corp. v. Atkinson (In re Great Plains Royalty Corp.), 471
F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1973) (requiring cooperative to refund patronage capital to corporation
which was a member of the cooporative). The court in Great Plains relied on the past practice of the
cooperative in regularly redeeming the stock of deceased members to hold that to refuse payment to a
bankrupt corporation was discrimination. Id. The applicability of the rationale of the court in Great
Plains has been questioned. See Richardson, 566 S.W.2d at 783-84 (expressly refusing to follow the
decision in Great Plains). It appears that the most the court's holding in Great Plains can be said to
stand for is the proposition that all cooperative members must be treated equally. See generally Great
Plains, 471 F.2d at 1261.
127. See Pearson v. Clam Falls Coop. Dairy Ass'n, 243 Wis. 369, -, 10 N.W.2d 132, 134
(1943) (member of cooperative could inhibit the plan for consolidation if member of cooperative
could insist on cash payment).
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dissenting members were entitled to immediate payment of their
equity credits. 128 In Weise v. Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., 129 the
Supreme Court of Iowa reasoned that in the absence of statutory
provisions which allowed two cooperatives to merge, the
transaction must be construed as a dissolution of one cooperative
and a sale of its assets to the other cooperative. 130 The court
concl'uded that members who requested compensation were entitled
to payment of their equity upon dissolution of the cooperative. 131
The clear lesson of this holding is that the proposed form of the
merger or consolidation must be carefully scrutinized pursuant to
local law to prevent unanticipated results.
2. Fairness Doctrine
In addition to the safeguards of ratification and appraisal
rights, stockholders have turned to the courts for relief from
proposed mergers and consolidations. Stockholders have used the
courts to sue for injunctions to prevent mergers or consolidations
132
or for damages once a merger or consolidation has occurred.
133
Violations of the securities laws are common complaints, 13 4 as are
accusations of conflict of interest or unfairness. 1
35
Ordinarily, the business judgment rule shields corporate
directors' decisions from court scrutiny.13 6 As with any other court
created doctrine, interpretations vary and exceptions exist. The
area of corporate mergers and consolidations is no exception.
There appear to be two reasons for the active role that many
courts have taken in the area of corporate mergers and
consolidations. First, the "fairness doctrine" has emerged as a
128. See, e.g., Weise v. Land O' Lakes Creameries, Inc., 191 N.W.2d619, 623 (Iowa 1971).
129. 191 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1971).
130. Weise v. Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 619,623 (Iowa 1971).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., id. at 621 (shareholders sought to have plan of merger invalidated on grounds that
proper notice of shareholder approval meeting was not given).
133. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1241 (7th Cir. 1977) (shareholders
sought damages to compensate for reduced earning potential of their corporate holdings).
134. See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 358 (2d Cir.
1979) (alleging fraud pursuant to Securities Exchange Act and rules and regulations); Mills, 552 F.2d
at 1240 (alleging deception by lack of disclosure in violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Harriman v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 138-39 (D. Del. 1975) (alleging
fraud, material misstatements and nondisclosures in violation of securities laws); Leighton v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 133, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
135. See, e.g., David J. Greene and Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 429-30 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(alleging gross unfairness based on detriment of merger to minority shareholders).
136. Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Delaware Law, 2 DEL.
JOUR. CORP. L. 44, 44-45 (1977) (court will ordinarily not substitute its judgment for the boards of
directors of the constituent corporations unless the terms of the merger are so patently unfair as to
shock the conscience of the court). The business judgment rule presumes that the actions of the board
of directors are reasonable and not to be second guessed after the fact in absence of fraud or gross
negligence on the part of the board of directors. See id.
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general exception to the business judgment rule and is applied in
situations involving conflicts of interests. 3 7 This doctrine is
invoked when one corporation in a merger controls or dominates
the other corporation and there is potential for self-dealing in the
transaction. 1 38  Secondly, courts in general have been less
deferential to boards of directors and have taken a much more
active role in regulating the affairs of corporations in all spheres of
activity, not just mergers and consolidations. For whatever reason,
this active review of corporate activities often results in a de novo
review of the terms of the proposed or actual merger for their
overall fairness. 139
Courts looking to the fairness of the merger or consolidation
have developed several different approaches. Among them is
determining whether stockholders receive cash or securities which
are at least the substantial equivalent in value of the stock they
surrender, 1 40 whether the price paid for the acquired stock is within
the range of prices its stockholders would have received if the
corporation had been sold in its entirety to another unaffiliated
purchaser, 41 and whether the gains to be achieved as a result of the
merger or consolidation are being divided equitably. 1 42
While there are no reported decisions applying the fairness
doctrine to cooperative mergers or consolidations, it seems safe to
assume that the concepts of fair dealing and fair value which the
"fairness doctrine" embody are applicable to cooperative mergers
and consolidations. Because a cooperative's stock is ordinarily not
transferable without the permission of the cooperative's board of
directors, 43 and each member has only one vote regardless of how
many shares of stock are owned,' 44 it is unlikely that problems of
137. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A. 2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (intrinsic fairness test,
not business judgment rule, applied in transaction involving parent and subsidiary corporation).
138. See id. Self-dealing would occur for example, when one corporation owns a controlling
interest in another corporation and makes a decision that is advantageous to itself and detrimental to
the other corporation's interests. See id.
139. See, e.g., DavidJ. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968);
seealso Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 136, at 45(court will examine de novo the terms of the merger of
two corporations if one corporation dominates the other corporation).
140. See, e.g., Dunhill, 249 A.2d at 432; see also Brudney & Chitelstein, supra note 113, at 307
(discussing standards of fairness imposed by courts in parent- subsidiary mergers).
141. See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 140 (Del. 1980) (applying standard of
damages based upon an amount all shareholders would have received in a third party sale negotiated
at arms length); see also Chazen, Fairnessfrom a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies:
Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW 1439, 1439 ([981) (discussing
standard of fairness based on third party sales).
142. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1248 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying the
sharing of gains test); see also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 113, at 310 (discussing cases
suggesting a fairness standard based on a sharing of the gains resulting ,rom the merger).
143. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 308.06(2)(5)(1986) (shares of stock transferable only upon approval
of the board of directors).
144. See T. WHITNEY, supra note 7, at 18 (member has one vote regardless of number of shares
owned).
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conflict of interest could arise which trigger the exception to the
business judgment rule.1 45 This does not mean, however, that
courts would refuse to review the merger or consolidation if some
other alternative for court jurisdiction exists.
3. Abrogation of the Merger or Consolidation
While court challenges to corporate mergers are common,
there are only a few reported decisions challenging a cooperative
merger or consolidation. 46 The only decision in which dissenting
members were successful in preventing the merger or consolidation
of the cooperative entirely is an old decision with unusual facts. 
1 47
The absence of reported court challenges to mergers is
especially unusual in light of the large numbers of cooperative
mergers that have been reported to the United States Department
of Agriculture in the past ten years.' 48 Because many state coop-
erative incorporation statutes are silent on the topic of merger or
consolidation or have incomplete procedures, any proposed
cooperative merger or consolidation must be carefully
approached. 4 9  Throughout the initial planning stages, the
ratification by the boards of directors and members, and the
. 145. A cooperative ordinarily cannot obtain a controlling interest in another cooperative by
buying up the stock of that cooperative since a member has only one vote regardless of the number of
shares owned. See WHITNEY, supra note 7, at 18. Thus, since the potential for self-dealing by a
controlling interestholder is not present, the conflict of interest exception to the business judgment
rule is not triggered. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del.
Ch. 1968) (when persons who control the making of transaction and fixing of the terms are on both
sides, business judgment rule does not apply). In theory, however, such a conflict could be created in
a triangular merger since the surviving corporation is usually the sole shareholder of its subsidiary.
For a discussion of triangular mergers, see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Weise v. Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1971)
(dissenting members sought invalidation of merger based on improper notice of member approval
meeting); Moore v. Hillsdale County Tel. Co., 171 Mich. 388, 399, 137 N.W. 241, 245 (1912)
(court determined that merger was subject to approval by all voting members of the cooperative);
Pearson v. Clam Falls Coop. Dairy Ass'n, 243 Wis. 369, -, 10 N.W.2d 132, 133 (1943) (dissenting
members sought abrogation of the merger based on lack of statutory authority for consolidations of
cooperatives, but court determined that the statutory provisions for cooperative mergers were broad
enough to include consolidation of cooperatives).
147. See Moore, 171 Mich. at 399, 137 N.W. at 245. In Moore, a village telephone cooperative
joined with another telephone cooperative, notwithstanding the dissent of some of the village
cooperative's members. Id. at 393-94, 137 N.W. at 243. The court determined that the joining of the
cooperatives was not an actual merger but rather a dissolution and sale of the assets of the village
cooperative. Id. at 399, 137 N.W. at 245. The court further determined that a dissolution requires
approval by all of the members of the cooperative. Id. at 399, 137 N.W. at 245. The court concluded
that all members did not approve of the dissolution and then ordered the abrogation of the joined
cooperatives. Id. at 399, 137 N.W. at 245.
148. See Letter from Charles A. Kraenzle, Director of the Cooperative Management Division of
the Agricultural Cooperative Service, to Kathryn J. Sedo (Aug. 13, 1984) (discussing Agricultural
Cooperative Service statistics on cooperative mergers, consolidations, and liquidations during the
period between 1976 through 1985). For a discussion of Agricultural Cooperative Service statistics
on cooperative mergers, consolidations, and liquidations during the period between 1976 through
1985, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
149. For a list of states which have statutory provisions for mergers and consolidations, see supra
note 5.
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implementation of the terms of the merger or consolidation once
approved, cooperatives would do well to ensure that their members
are informed about the terms and that the terms are equitable.
Fairness of terms and education of members in addition to careful
judicial scrutiny and observance of state statutes will minimize
court challenges and hopefully result in victory for the cooperative
should such a challenge be mounted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cooperative mergers and consolidations are one response to a
distressed farm economy. If properly structured and explained to
members, a merger or consolidation can result in the continued
existence of cooperatives as an alternative economic model for farm
producers.
The absence of provisions or incomplete procedures for
mergers or consolidations in the cooperative incorporation statutes
results in confusion and speculation about how cooperatives that
wish to merge or consolidate must proceed. One can only counsel
caution for those seeking to advise cooperatives in light of this state
of affairs.
Because cooperatives are fundamentally different from regular
business corporations, resorting to procedures and doctrines of law
developed for mergers and consolidations of regular corporations is
generally not useful. While the applicability of securities and
antitrust laws to cooperatives must also be examined, special
attention must be accorded to the provisions and case law that
provide for different treatment for cooperatives.
Obviously the varying state statutes have an effect on the form
the merger or consolidation will take. Other laws such as securities
and antitrust laws must be considered. Similarly, the federal tax
laws must be consulted to minimize their impact on any merger or
consolidation. These laws must be considered in light of the needs
and desires of the cooperatives and their members. While any
merger or consolidation is complex, their utility insures that they
will continue to occur.
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